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ISSUES
Does the Pole Attachments Act of
1996 apply to utility pole attachments used by cable systems that
simultaneously provide high-speed
Internet access and conventional
cable TV? Does it apply to the
attachments used by providers
of wireless telecommunications
services?
FACTS
The 1996 Pole Attachment Act (47
U.S.C. § 224) gives providers of
cable and telecommunications services the right to attach wires to the
poles of power and telephone companies. If the power and telephone
companies will not accept the rent
the providers offer to pay, the
Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) sets the rent.
The FCC has adopted regulations
containing a formula for computing
the rent.

wires that were "overlashed" (overlashing occurs when an attacher
physically ties additional cables to
cables already attached to the pole).
According to the FCC, the 1996 Act
gives it the authority to regulate the
placement of wireless communications equipment and attachments
for Internet service on utility poles.
In addition, the FCC has also ruled
that the 1996 Act precluded utilities
from receiving rent for unused wires
within fiber optic cables (so-called
"dark fiber") that are attached to
the poles. (Dark fiber is "bare
capacity" and does not involve any
of the electronics necessary to
transmit or receive signals over that
capacity.)
Gulf Power Co. and a number of
other utility companies
(Respondents) petitioned the courts
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of appeals for review of the FCC's
ruling. The cases were consolidated
in the Eleventh Circuit.
A divided panel of the Eleventh
Circuit held that the FCC lacks the
authority to regulate the placement
of wireless equipment on utility
poles and attachments for Internet
service. The court explained that
the 1996 Act gives the FCC authority to regulate pole attachments that
are used, at least in part, for wire
communications, and by negative
implication does not give the FCC
authority over pole attachments
that are used for wireless communications. Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208
F.3d 1263 (11th Cir.2000). Noting
that the original purpose behind
regulating utility poles was to prevent utility companies from charging monopoly rents to connect to
their "bottleneck facilities," the
court of appeals stated that the
poles are not bottleneck facilities for
wireless systems, since their attachments could be placed on any tall
building and wireless networks may
continue working even if one antenna malfunctions.
The court of appeals also rejected
the FCC's conclusion that Internet
services provided by a cable television system are subject to regulation under the 1996 act. In the
court's view, for "the FCC to be able
to regulate the rent for an attachment that provides Internet service
... Internet service must qualify as
either a cable service or a telecommunications service." The court
concluded that such Internet access
is neither cable service nor telecommunications service and that the
FCC therefore has no authority to
regulate rates for pole attachments
by cable operators that carry cable
television and Internet access
through the same wires.
The Eleventh Circuit determined,
however, that the FCC's decision

regarding dark fiber constitutes a
reasonable interpretation of the
1996 Act. The court of appeals
declined to address a takings claim
and the overlashing claim on the
ground that those claims were not
ripe for adjudication.
The Supreme Court thereafter
granted the petitions of the FCC
and the National Cable Television
Association, Inc. (Petitioners), and
agreed to review the Eleventh
Circuit's decision. 121 S.Ct. 879
(2001).
CASE ANALYSIS
From the beginning, cable television
companies have attached their
cables to the utility poles owned by
power and telephone companies.
Factors such as zoning restrictions,
environmental regulations, and
start-up costs made other options
infeasible. The attachment agreements between the cable television
companies and utilities have generally been voluntary. However, the
lack of alternatives has given the
power and telephone companies an
advantage in negotiating attachment
agreements. In response to this
problem, in 1978 Congress enacted
the Pole Attachment Act (47 U.S. §
224).
The 1978 act specified a range of
rents that telephone and power
companies could charge the cable
television companies for attaching
cables to their poles. Under the act,
however, the cable television companies had no right to attach their
cables; the utilities could reject a
cable television company's request
to attach to their poles.
The FCC then promulgated rules
under the 1978 act, providing complaint and enforcement procedures
to ensure that the rates, terms, and
conditions for cable television pole
attachments were just and reasonable. Under the FCC's formula, the

maximum rent the utility could
charge was the attacher's proportionate share of the bare costs of
maintaining the pole and the "carrying charges" associated with the
pole.
After the FCC promulgated these
rules, several cable television companies in Florida filed complaints
with the FCC contending that a
power company was charging them
unreasonable rents to attach. The
FCC agreed that the rates were
unreasonable and set a lower rent.
The utility appealed from this ruling, claiming that the FCC's acti6n
amounted to a taking of the utility's
property without just compensation.
The Supreme Court held that no
"taking" occurred because the utility had voluntarily agreed to the
cable companies' attachments. FCC
v. FloridaPower Corp., 480 U.S.
245 (1987). The Court suggested
that, had Congress in the 1978 act
required utilities to allow the
attachments, a taking may have
occurred.
In 1984, Congress enacted the
Cable Communications Policy Act
of 1984 (47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559).
Before the 1984 act, cable television
companies operated under exclusive
franchises granted by a local government. Because these franchises
effectively gave the companies
monopolies in the franchise territory, the local governments regulated
the rates they could charge subscribers. In order to encourage competition, Congress eliminated the
power of local governments to set
rates for "basic" cable service.
Although prices might increase in
the short run, Congress believed
that prices would decrease in the
long run as local governments granted additional franchises for a given
territory. New cable companies
would be able to enter the market
and compete with the incumbent
(Continued on Page 14)
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cable company-but only if they
could obtain utility attachments on
the same terms as those given to
the incumbent cable company.
In Texas Utilities Electric Co. v.
FCC, 997 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1993),
the D.C. Circuit considered whether
the pre-1996 version of the act permitted cable systems to pay the regulated rate when they provided
cable services commingled with
noncable services. The D.C. Circuit
deferred to the FCC's interpretation
that commingled services were covered by the act because, prior to
1996, the act did not specify the
particular services of a cable television system that were entitled to a
regulated rent.
In addition to making new demands
for pole space, a number of new
telecommunications carriers (such
as new long-distance telephone carriers and wide-area telephone service providers) that used wires to
carry their signals began seeking to
rent space on poles. Because the
1978 act only regulated the rents
utilities could charge cable television companies, many utilities
demanded monopoly rents from
these telecommunications carriers.
In order to fix this problem, in 1996
Congress amended the 1978 act to
give entities providing telecommunications and cable-television service
the right to "nondiscriminatory
access" to utility poles. Should the
parties be unable to agree to the
terms of the attachments, including
the rent, the 1996 act authorized
the FCC to set "just and reasonable"
terms. The 1996 act also (1) redefined "utility" to encompass "any
person who is a local exchange carrier, or an electric, gas, water,
steam, or other public utility;"
(2) redefined "pole attachment" to
include attachments by providers of
telecommunications service; (3)
directed the FCC to create a formu-

la for determining the attachment
rent that a utility could charge a
telecommunications service
provider; and (4) instructed utilities
on how to apportion the costs of
"unusable" and "usable" space on
their poles among telecommunications service providers.
In 1998, the FCC issued regulations
implementing its authority under
the 1996 act. The FCC interpreted
the 1996 act to require that utility
companies give Internet providers
access to their poles because the
Internet was a cable service. It also
interpreted the 1996 act to mean
that telephone and power companies would have to accept pole
attachments for wireless telephone
equipment. The FCC determined
that the 1996 act precludes utilities
from receiving rent for overlashed
wires unless those wires significantly increase the burden on the pole.
Finally, the FCC interpreted the act
to prohibit utilities from receiving
rent for dark fiber. The FCC then
articulated formulas for determining
the attachment rents utilities may
charge telecommunications service
providers.
The petitioners in this case now
argue that the Pole Attachments Act
of 1996 protects pole attachments
by cable television systems that provide commingled cable television
service as well as attachments by
providers of wireless telecommunications services. The petitioners
argue that the act's phrase "any
attachment by a cable television
system or provider of telecommunications service" includes an attachment by a cable television system
that is used to provide commingled
cable television.
The respondents counter that the
1996 act does not apply to attachments used for delivery of commingled cable and Internet service.
Declaring that a "cable television

system" is not synonymous with a
cable "company," respondents argue
that a cable modem service is neither a cable service nor a telecommunications service.
The petitioners claim that Congress
had sound policy reasons not to
accept the rule adopted by the
Eleventh Circuit, a rule that it
claims would penalize cable television systems for providing commingled Internet access by removing
their attachments from the Act's
protections as soon as such Internet
access is provided. Contending that
Congress delegated to the FCC the
authority to implement the 1996
act, the petitioners declare that the
courts must defer to the FCC's reasonable construction of the Act.
Respondents, on the other hand,
contend that the Eleventh Circuit's
decision is fully consistent with
Congress' policy of promoting
deployment of high-speed services.
Respondents say that the FCC has
avoided the question posed by
attachments that provide high-speed
Internet access and conventional
cable television simultaneously and,
thus, that its interpretation of the
act is not entitled to deference with
respect to this issue.
The respondents point out that
Congress has declared that it is the
policy of the United States "to preserve the vibrant and competitive
free market that presently exists for
the Internet and other interactive
computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State regulation."
Because cable Internet service was
left out of the 1996 act, the respondents argue that cable companies
and their chief competitors in the
Internet business must pay the
same unregulated rates for Internet
attachments.
With respect to the Eleventh
Circuit's conclusion that the 1996
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act provides limited or no protection for wireless-as opposed to
wireline-telecommunications services, the FCC argues that the definition of a "covered" pole attachment
in the act makes no distinction
between providers of wireless
telecommunications service and
providers of wireline telecommunications service. Once it is determined that certain poles are subject
to the act because they are used for
wire communications, the petitioners say, the Act calls for no further
distinctions to be made on the basis
of whether the attachments to those
poles are used to provide wireless or
wireline telecommunications service. Once an attachment is made
by a provider of telecommunications service, it is protected by the
act, whether the attaching entity
uses wireless, wireline, or some
hybrid type of facility to provide the
telecommunications service.
The FCC states that it is the unqualified term "provider of telecommunications service," not a court's conception of what constitutes a "bottleneck facility," that defines the
scope of the act's protections. The
FCC suggests that the Eleventh
Circuit was wrong in suggesting that
utility poles are not "bottleneck
facilities for wireless systems." It
says that wireless systems are typically "wireless" only between the
subscriber's wireless telephone (or,
in the case of "fixed wireless" systems, between a central location in
the subscriber's building) and the
nearest receiving antenna.
"Wireless" providers often depend
on actual wires attached to poles to
get their signals from such antennas
back to a central location, where
they are connected to a network
that may itself include pole-to-pole
wireline facilities. It concludes that,
as a practical matter, a wireless
telecommunications service may
well depend on poles owned or controlled by utilities.

Respondents assert that the act
does not cover attachments of wireless telecommunications equipment.
Acknowledging that the act applies
to attachments by wireless carriers,
respondents assert that the dispute
pertains to the type of facilities a
wireless carrier can attach; the
question is whether the act extends
to wireless equipment, not to wireless carriers. Stating that they have
never taken the position that the
wireline segments of a wireless carrier's network are outside the act,
the respondents contend that wireless equipment is not covered.
Thus, respondents state that a wireline attachment is subject to the act
to the extent a wireless carrier
seeks to attach a wireline facility to
a utility pole, whether for "traffic
backhaul, redundancy, intermodal
operations," or other purposes.
SIGNIFICANCE
The regulation of cable-based platforms for high-speed access to the
Internet has become one of the
most controversial subjects in communications law. See Jim Chen,
"The Authority to Regulate
Broadband Internet Access Over
Cable," 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 677
(2001). At one time, cable systems
were regarded merely as a means of
delivering television signals to rural
areas. Now, however, these systems
can supply high-speed Internet
access throughout the United
States. A recent study has indicated
that, within three years, cable
modems will occupy 86 percent of
the American wireline broadband
market. Christopher Duffy, Note,
"The Statutory Classification of
Cable-Delivered Internet Service,"
100 Colum. L. Rev. 1251 (2000),
citing a Forrester Research study.
This suggests that in the broadband
market, cable will be a dominant
player, if not the primary one. Id.
This case presents difficult and
complex technical and statutory

issues that may resolve important
questions of regulatory authority
over open access in cable broadband. Although the 1996 act was
hailed as the regulatory reform
needed for the digital age, the act's
definitions contain technological
and marketplace anachronisms that
may be inconsistent with the direction of the telecommunications
industry then and now. Steve Kelley,
"Liberating Our Digital Future: How
the 1996 Telecommunications Act
Definitions Are Hobbling Change,"
27 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 2137
(2001). These definitions create
internal conceptual problems, interpretive difficulties for the FCC and
the courts, policy-making problems
for states, and implementation challenges at multiple levels of government and industry. Id.
The difficulties in this case are illustrated by the courts of appeals'
attempts to determine the nature of
cable broadband Internet access. In
AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216
F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth
Circuit held that cable broadband
Internet access service was not a
"cable service" as defined in the
communications act because the
essence of cable service is one-way
transmission of programming to
subscribers generally. The Ninth
Circuit held that where a provider's
service consisted of a "pipeline"
with cable broadband and Internet
service both transmitted through
that pipeline, the provider was providing "telecommunications services" as defined in the communications act.
The Fourth Circuit has observed
that the issue of the proper regulatory classification of cable modem
service is complex and subject to
considerable debate. MediaOne
Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico,
257 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2001). It concluded that a cable modem service
(Continued on Page 16)
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was a telecommunications facility
regulated by federal law.
The Eleventh Circuit in Gulf Power
Co. held that a cable modem service
was neither a cable service nor a
telecommunications service under
the communications. act. See also
Christopher Duffy, Note, "The
Statutory Classification of CableDelivered Internet Service," 100
Colum. L. Rev. 1251 (2000) (cabledelivered Internet service is an
information service, not a cable or
telecommunications service).
Respondents suggest that a decision
upholding the Eleventh Circuit
would allow utilities to charge cable
television companies that also provide Internet service prices for using
their utility poles that are determined by market forces. This would
undoubtedly result in increased
income for the utilities. Because the
1996 act applies to telecommunications carriers providing Internet service using DSL technology over the
same wires transmitting traditional
telecommunications services such
as telephone service, the rent
charged to the telecommunications
carrier for both telephone service
and high-speed Internet access
could be controlled by the FCC.
However, if the FCC cannot restrain
the rent for cable-provided Internet
access, the cable competitor would
be at a severe competitive disadvantage. Steve Kelley, "Liberating Our
Digital Future: How the 1996
Telecommunications Act Definitions
Are Hobbling Change," 27 Win.
Mitchell L. Rev. 2137 (2001).
Petitioners reason that a decision
reversing the Eleventh Circuit
would restrict what utilities could
charge for attachments to their
poles, and they suggest that such a
decision would actually enhance
competition. Such a ruling would
undoubtedly reduce the costs of
cable companies and increase their

profits. However, if cable broadband
Internet services can be regulated as
"telecommunications service," but a
conventional Internet service
provider (ISP) cannot be regulated
because there is no state or FCC
regulatory power over information
services, there is a potential for regulatory discrimination between entities that are in competition with
each other. Steve Kelley, "Liberating
Our Digital Future: How the 1996
Telecommunications Act Definitions
Are Hobbling Change," 27 Win.
Mitchell L. Rev. 2137 (2001).
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